Honour Before Pragmatism: What Lessons Can We Learn from The Fukushima Nuclear Debacle?

When I began to put this article together the recorded radiation levels around the storage tanks of the Fukushima Nuclear Plant stood at 1,800 millisieverts. By Tuesday a ground reading of 2,200 mSv, a 22% rise, was duly noted.

The Problem The plant incurred damage in the wake of the 2011 Japanese tsunami. Coolant systems were disrupted and three reactors proceeded to ‘meltdown’. Plant engineers and clean-up workers have struggled with the arduous challenge of keeping the fission reactors cool. Coolant water (up to 400 tonnes per day) is used to this end. The inevitable consequence of this process is the accretion of a large volume of contaminated waste water. Up to 300 tonnes are estimated to have reached the Pacific Ocean to date.

The integrity of the Fukushima equipment is far from stable. TEPCO (the Tokyo Electric Power Co.) found that storage tanks for contaminated water were leaking. The radiation readings above can be attributed to these leaks. Pipes and other damaged structures have also contributed to the problem.

Japan’s Response The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) of Japan alleged that affected areas ‘were easily contained’. Noting the rapid development of the situation in the past fortnight, Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan reminded the media of the imperative need “to take drastic measures of a maximum scale” in reducing contamination. His Government has adopted a financially charged stance, pledging a further ¥47 billion (£304 million) in relief. His prudence in relation to the matter has been noted by the international community; Tokyo is a candidate city for the 2020 Olympic Games.

Scientists at the Fukushima plant will attempt to curb contamination by establishing a 27 metre ‘Ice Wall’. The crux of the approach is that freeze pipes containing coolant will freeze surrounding soil, inhibiting groundwater flow. The project is billed to take 6-8 weeks to complete. In sum the people of Japan have thus far taken an enterprising approach to make the best of a bad situation. Their actions have proven that they acknowledge their culpability on both a national and global scale.

I contacted a Mr. Abdul Patel (MPhil Nuclear Energy, The University of Cambridge and Imperial College alumnus) to ask his opinion on the Ice Wall strategy,

“Unlike Chernobyl, I think the Japanese government did the best they could to address the disaster and it is unfortunate the way the events occurred…The decision to erect an ice wall is the right step but it is a question of who will foot the bill.”

Abdul Patel has tapped into the need for wider debate. The relevant authorities need to acknowledge their shortcomings if Japan is to move forward. In the case of Fukushima the financial, environmental and indeed social consequences of the disaster are clear evidence of the need for a more cohesive approach to energy provision.

Impeding Factors and Lessons Learned The overarching criticism from many parties has been the location of a nuclear plant in a geologically volatile region. Coupled with previous knowledge of earthquakes and subsequent tsunamis in the Pacific Ocean (principally Sumatra, 2004) the drawbacks seem blatant, albeit with hindsight.

This in turn has led to criticism of the integrity of equipment at the Fukushima Nuclear Plant. As cited by Abdul Patel, “The reactors at Fukushima were old, they were designed poorly and it was inevitable that something like this would happen… Modern reactors are fitted with measures so that events such as natural disasters are mitigated; the drawback is that it is exorbitantly expensive to fund them.”

This taps into the contentious debate surrounding nuclear reactors all over the planet. There is a lobby that proposes decommissioning any nuclear facilities if they are outdated, leeching money as well as nuclear pollutants. Sellafield in the United Kingdom is a prime example. It is also worth noting that this argument contributed to Germany’s cessation of its nuclear facilities; the move was catalysed in the wake of the Fukushima disaster.

My chief criticism is of the blatantly poor relations between the nuclear utilities and the Japanese government, both before and after the tsunami of 2011. As highlighted by the Global Times, TEPCO has faced multifaceted criticism.

“The embattled utility is under fire from the NRA, the government and the wider global community, who have consistently pointed out that TEPCO is slow to release vital information regarding its myriad [of] problems and the accuracy of its radioactivity measuring has once again been called into question.”

Pointing the finger won’t work. Fukushima proves the imperative need for swift action by an integrated body of politicians, academics and utilities to inhibit environmental disaster. The Japanese government has partially acknowledged this through their emergency financial drivers but there is some way to go.

This proposes the need to address company dynamics, giving credence to the role of culture and localized society. Abdul Patel insightfully hit the nail on the head, “This was a failure of the Japanese governments and utilities…exacerbated by the Japanese's reluctance to question their superiors (i.e. people lower down who recognized the safety flaws would not dare question their bosses).”

It is ironic to think that the steadfast adherence of the Japanese people to a rigorously regimental culture focused on honour may have limited the country’s response to the disaster. One solution would be to establish an independent watchdog, with the role of supervising and assisting the trajectory of free information through the ranks.

Conclusion Be it honour over pragmatism, debate over finance or apportionment of blame, the deterioration of Fukushima Nuclear Plant provides a moral for an, as of yet, incomplete story; that of humanity’s response to natural disaster and climate change.

When I was a mere Fresher I submitted an article to Felix in November 2011, angry about governmental approach to climate change. My mantra was as follows, “We should rid climate change of its label. It should be integrated into everything we do.” I stand by it today. The ongoing Japanese crisis proves that rapid response to natural disaster needs to be instinctive, free from the chains of label, politics and funding. Failure to do so will affect us all on a cultural, societal, even the most basic levels, as has been demonstrated in Japan over the past two and a half years.

I’ll close with a comment from Abdul Patel, “I am no expert so I may be wrong but I postulate that the contamination and release of radioactive particles such as tritium will never fully be removed.” The Fukushima debacle is not a Japanese crisis. It’s global.

Eoghan J Totten